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[Appearing below is the second of a two-article series. The first was published in the 09/20/91
issue of the Central America Update. The series examines the crisis faced by the Nicaraguan
government on the heels of three related developments: collapse of the "political center," and
conflict between the executive branch and the legislature with the defection of Alfredo Cesar
from President Violeta Chamorro's inner circle to the right-wing camp; the explosive issue of
property ownership; and the specter of renewed military conflict. The first article focused on the
defection of Cesar, one of Nicaragua's most pivotal and powerful political figures, and his efforts
to capture the leadership of an insurgent right-wing movement. The second part links political
developments discussed previously to the property issue and the potential for renewed military
conflict.] . Robinson The property issue: revolution and counterrevolution During the Sandinista
government, the structure of property ownership was radically democratized in favor of poor
peasants in the countryside and the urban poor, to the detriment of rural and urban landlords. The
Sandinista agrarian reform redistributed about half the country's arable land, or over 2.4 million
ha., to 120,000 households. The distribution of thousands of urban lots and homes benefitted an
estimated 80,000 households. Between 1 million and 1.5 million Nicaraguans were beneficiaries
in this democratization of property ownership. Since the 1990 elections, the right's most strident
demand has been a restoration of pre-revolutionary property relations, including compensation
to and return of confiscated and redistributed properties to former owners. Before taking office,
the Chamorro administration negotiated a "Transitional Protocol" with the outgoing Sandinistas.
In brief, under the protocol the new government agreed to accept the existing constitutional order
and respect the basic institutions and social transformations carried out during the revolutionary
regime. The protocol committed the new government to respect the property redistribution that
took place under the Sandinistas, and specifically, to uphold three executive decrees 85, 86, and 88
passed during the final weeks of the Sandinista government. The decrees legalized the property
redistribution which took place between 1979 and 1990. (The Sandinistas did not expect to lose
the February 1990 elections, and consequently never bothered to legalize ownership of urban
and rural property redistributed since 1979.) Thus, beneficiaries of the Sandinista redistribution
are at odds with former urban and rural landowners, estimated at about 35,000 people. The
crux of the issue is preservation of the economic democratization that took place during the
Sandinista government versus efforts to reverse the redistribution and restore pre-revolutionary
property relations. The property struggle between the rich landlords on the one hand, and popular
sectors in the countryside and the cities on the other has taken on political overtones: a fight
between competing groups associated with the government, the political parties of the Nicaraguan
Opposition Union (UNO) coalition and the private sector. Further complicating the issue has
been the matter of abuses and irregularities that accompanied the process of redistribution and
economic democratization, known as the Sandinista "pinata." The right has clearly taken advantage
of abuses to launch an attack on the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) as part of its
overall political agenda. The far-right Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PNC), which drafted a
bill in April to annul decrees 85, 86 and 88, was able to disguise its initiative whose effect would
be the virtual reversal of the agrarian and urban reform of the last 10 years , as a populist and
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righteous effort to confront Sandinista corruption and the "pinata." FSLN leader Bayardo Arce,
in a recent full-page commentary in the newspaper Barricada, responded to the outcry over
the "pinata": millions of hectares of land distributed under the previous government's agrarian
reform consisted of property confiscated from peasants over the last two centuries by the agroexporting bourgeoisie for the introduction of coffee, cotton and other commercial crops, under the
military and political auspices of elite regimes and the Somoza dictatorship. According to Arce,
"The so-called `Sandinista pinata' was principally an exercise in returning to the people what the
`Somocista pinata' had taken away from them. But the difference is that in `our pinata' we invited
all Nicaraguans who wanted justice in Nicaragua." In addition, Arce recalled that the Sandinistas
have repeatedly proposed that the Chamorro administration conduct a systematic review of
property distributed under their government, and that any corruption or abuses uncovered be
dealt with accordingly. Nevertheless, the issue of the "pinata" proved a bonanza for the right,
which was able simultaneously to push its agenda for economic counterrevolution, and to launch
political attacks on its principal adversary, the FSLN. Cesar assumes leadership of the right In
this context, the property issue presented a multidimensional platform on which Cesar could
firmly anchor his strategy. The PNC bill, introduced in April, received immediate support from
Cesar, who submitted it to the Assembly property committee, which Cesar himself heads. The
committee announced its recommendations in July a virtual endorsement of the initiative, now
under Cesar's tutelage. Cesar was further encouraged in his efforts upon receiving a "Dear
Colleague" letter from about 50 members of the US Congress expressing support for his efforts and
condemning Sandinista "threats to democracy" (read FSLN and workers' protests over the effort
to restore former property relations). Lacayo has reiterated on several occasions that the executive
would resist a wholesale return of property to former owners. "We are not going to prioritize the
problem of 35,000 expropriated Nicaraguans above the problem of poverty that affects 50% of the
population," he said. The Lacayo technocrats are opposed to Cesar's property initiative because
they see preservation of the economic democratization that took place under the Sandinistas
as essential for maintaining social stability and not at all inimical to their project of capitalist
modernization for Nicaragua. The technocrats are also strongly opposed to the confrontational
form in which Cesar and the right are pushing the issue with political motives, and in disregard
for the consensus on property which has come out of the "concertacion" forum. This forum brings
together representatives from trade unions, grassroots organizations, the government, and small
and large-scale producers. The forum's first agreement, a "social pact" on the economic austerity
program, emerged in October 1990. Such "concertacion" methods are central to Lacayo's approach
to governance through negotiation and the search for consensus and social stability. In May,
the concertacion forum was reopened to debate the property issue, and in mid-August signed
an agreement with very different conclusions from those of Cesar and his National Assembly
property commission. The concertacion accord on property argued for preservation, with certain
modifications, of the current structures of property ownership. Luis Carrion, a Sandinista leader
who participated in the forum, said: "This accord is a transcendental event for the future of
Nicaragua because it recognizes and legitimizes, once more, the democratic transformation of
property carried out by the Sandinista revolution. It establishes the basis for reaching a permanent
and definitive solution to the thorny issue of property, which is a central factor in the political and
social instability the country has been engulfed in." Just days before Cesar's property commission
released its recommendations, Lacayo, and then President Chamorro herself, publicly called
on Cesar to back down on the property issue by postponing his report and incorporating into
it the recommendations of the "concertacion" forum. Cesar, however, upped the ante, inviting
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numerous national leaders and foreign diplomats to attend a special Assembly session he convened
to present his report. Sitting next to Cesar's wife (Lacayo's sister) in attendance at the special
session was US Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman. With his aggressive opposition to Lacayo and
his hard- line position on the property issue, Cesar unequivocally captured the leadership of the
emerging center-right in Nicaraguan politics. Virgilio Godoy, Cesar's arch rival only a few months
ago, said, "It is not what I had ever expected, but I have to admit that Cesar has now taken up the
positions we have been fighting for all along. He [Cesar] is now leading us." Constitutional crisis
On August 19, President Chamorro promulgated two decrees which effectively transformed into
law the agreements on property reached in the concertacion forum. Four days later, on August 23,
the 53 UNO representatives in the National Assembly unanimously approved Cesar's property
committee recommendations. (The 39 FSLN deputies unanimously voted against them, and then
walked out of the Assembly in protest.) The once-divided UNO legislative bloc had given way to
a united legislature of the right under Cesar's leadership. "Whether they (the executive) like it or
not, this will become the law of the land," said Cesar, adding that even if Chamorro vetoes the law
as she indicated she would or the Supreme Court rules it unconstitutional, the Assembly would
make the necessary corrections but would "get its way in the end." Sergio Ramirez, former vice
president of Nicaragua and current head of the Sandinista bench in the Assembly, described the
Cesar-led move to ram the property committee report through as law as a "constitutional coup
d'etat." Beyond the notion of Cesar's tactic of legislating retroactively, Ramirez was referring
to the fact that by trying to pass his property bill, Cesar would have to "abolish" Chamorro's
executive decrees based on the concertacion accord on property. By such retroactive juridical
maneuvers and by overturning presidential decrees, Cesar's bloc is overstepping its legislative
mandate as stipulated in the constitution and simultaneously bypassing executive authority. Lucio
Jimenez, leader of the powerful National Workers Front (FNT), issued a warning: "If Alfredo
Cesar continues his course, we will take to the streets to defend what has been agreed upon in
the concertacion forum." Destabilization of the Chamorro government Without waiting for the
resolution of the property issue, Cesar and the right wasted no time in broadening the attack into
an all-out offensive against the Chamorro government. In late August, Cesar associate Deputy
Hernaldo Zuniga introduced a bill which claims the judiciary branch "lacks morals," and stipulates
that the president of the National Assembly or any group of at least five deputies would have the
power to summon Supreme Court members before the legislature to defend him or herself. On
September 9, UNO representatives in the Assembly approved a bill to overturn another law passed
during the Sandinistas' final days in office, and which is explicitly protected under the Transition
Protocol. The law stipulates that the new names given to parks, avenues and other public sites
would be respected. (For instance, Managua's central avenue was renamed "Bolivar Boulevard"
after the Latin American hero, replacing "Roosevelt Boulevard" (after the former US president.)
Although of minor practical importance, the move was considered symbolic of the right's drive
to restore Nicaragua to its pre-1979 status as a US satellite. The Cesar-led Assembly has shown
great resolve in its attempt to usurp presidential powers and to gut the substance of the Transition
Protocol, thereby provoking a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches
of government. Former president Daniel Ortega charged that the moves by the right headed by
Cesar were part of a "destabilization plan" to undermine the Chamorro government, forcing it to
step down before the end of the president's six- year term. Political-military convergence These
political challenges to the Chamorro presidency took a dangerous new turn in early September,
when extremist UNO representatives formed the "Group of Seven" within the National Assembly
after meeting with remobilized former contras, and declared "full support" for the "recontra"
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movement. The "recontras" are former Resistance members who took up arms in May. The recontra
ranks have grown since then to an estimated 2,000. Until recently, their actions have been confined
to the northern mountains of Matagalpa and Jinotega, and had no visible linkage to Managua
politics. Ironically, many of the "recontra" rank and file say they joined the movement because
the government has not been able to meet their demands for farm land, inputs and rural credit.
The Cesar initiative on the property issue would hardly meet the needs of the former contras'
"land hunger." During the property law debates, however, the recontras extended their activities
to the volatile central region, or Chontales and Boaco departments. Recontra leader "Indomable"
announced that his forces were "in engaged in military reorganization," and had resolved to "fight
until the Sandinistas are no longer in a position of command." Indomable reiterated the right's
longstanding demand for dismantlement of the Sandinista-dominated armed forces. Meanwhile,
a leader of the former Costa-Rican based "Southern Front" contras who had been linked to
Cesar's old BOS organization announced his decision on September 11 to take up arms against
the Chamorro government. On the same day in Managua, the "Group of Seven" declared at a
press conference that the recontras enjoy "widespread popular support." Apparently, the right's
strategy is to utilize the recontras as an instrument of military pressure to push its legislative and
political agenda against the executive and the FSLN. With the situation in the countryside quickly
deteriorating, several armed leftist groups, presumed to be disaffected rank and file Sandinistas,
dubbed "recompas" (from the diminutive of "companero," or "compa") have taken up arms in
the countryside in response to the recontra movement and generalized instability and violence.
The recompa groups include "Danto 91," which operates in the northern Segovian mountains, the
"Pedro Altamirano column," and the "Revolutionary Armed Movement" (MAR). The recompas
have declared they are not interested in confronting the army, nor are they anti-Chamorro.
According to the recompas, they have been forced to rearm for self- defense, given the assassination
of over 200 Sandinista sympathizers in rural areas by recontras. The FSLN leadership has criticized
the emergence of "recompa" groups, and issued a statement expressing concern that "the acute
deterioration of the national reconciliation process...threatens the precarious national stability and
the peace which we Nicaraguans have achieved with so much effort and sacrifice." The ultimate
outcome of the current crisis is unclear, but it reflects the failure of Nicaragua's social and political
forces to have delineated the terms of stability and coexistence in the post-Sandinista period. In
mid-September, a nervous Lacayo said that the country could soon reach a situation "incompatible
with peace." The crisis between the executive and the legislative branches of government, and the
unresolved property issue could spark mass protests among workers and the unemployed. Add to
this recontras linked to rightist politicians shooting up the countryside, and recompas defending
themselves and persons linked to the FSLN. Taken as a whole, the situation may end up making
"incompatible with peace" a very mild way to describe how the current crisis may unfold.

-- End --
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